A U.S. citizen has been sentenced to four years in prison for acting as a spy for China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), sharing sensitive information during his employment in telecommunications. Ping Li, 59, of Wesley Chapel, Florida, conspired to gather information beneficial to the Chinese government, including details on Chinese dissidents and cybersecurity measures at major U.S. companies.
How a telecom employee became a secret asset for China’s intelligence agency
Li shared sensitive information while employed at Verizon and Infosys, two major players in the telecommunications and IT sectors. His involvement with the MSS dates back to 2012, and he communicated with MSS officers using anonymous online accounts. As part of his sentencing, he received a $250,000 fine and will undergo three years of supervised release after completing his prison term.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ), the MSS employs cooperative contacts outside of the PRC to further its intelligence aims, which span foreign corporate matters, political opponents, and activists. Ping Li was tasked with obtaining information about pro-democracy advocates, Falun Gong members, and relevant U.S.-based NGOs. He confessed to providing the MSS with information obtained from his employer and delivered data on additional topics that fell under the agency’s purview.
Among the details he relayed were insider information about Verizon’s training materials and responses to specific MSS queries related to U.S. hacking incidents. For instance, he shared insights on the SolarWinds cyberattack in 2021, which affected multiple U.S. government agencies. His methods included responding promptly to MSS requests, such as transmitting information about his new employer after his shift to an international IT firm in early 2022.
A sentencing memorandum detailed Li’s actions and how the information he provided fit into broader espionage activities aimed at the U.S. He was also active in discussing dissidents who had fled China and aided the MSS in gathering intelligence on those perceived as threats to the Chinese regime.
The case occurs amid intensified scrutiny of Chinese espionage efforts in the U.S., with the House Committee on Homeland Security reporting over 55 incidents of Chinese Communist Party-related espionage over the last two decades. The report highlighted a growing trend in which Chinese agents target sensitive military data, steal trade secrets, and pursue dissidents abroad.
In a related case, Shujun Wang from Queens, New York, was convicted for covertly collecting sensitive information while pretending to be a pro-democracy activist. This pattern emphasizes a concerning trend regarding foreign agents exploiting advocacy platforms to gather intelligence against perceived adversaries.
Investigations into these espionage activities remain ongoing, with the FBI’s National Security Branch confirming its role in Li’s case. Additional concerns about emerging cyber threats linked to state-sponsored actors solidify fears surrounding national security and corporate data integrity in the United States.
The potential for future cases similar to Li’s poses questions about the depth of foreign intelligence operations within the U.S., indicating that broader investigations into foreign infiltration and cybersecurity risks will likely continue.
Featured image credit: Danielle-Claude Bélanger/Unsplash
